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Abstract 
A new appproach to the problem of assessq causality for adverse drug 
reactions is presented. The approach is based on Bayesian probability theory, and 
it is desianed to anwer the following question in a logically satisfying and 
nonarbitrary way: pven all the available information, what is the probability that 
a given adverse clinical event was caused by some particular dru1 to which the 
patient had been e%posed? The approach is illustrated by a case in which 
amoliclllln is suspected of causinl diarrhea. Althoup much work remains to be 
done before the approach can be easily implemented, it 11 araued that the approach 
satisfies basic aiteria for causality assessment methods, a claim that cannot be 
made for any other currently available teclmique. 
ICey words: adverse drua reactions, causality assessment, probability, coherence 
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A BAYFSIAN APPROACH TO CAUSALJlT ASS~MENT I: FOUNDATIONS 
The answers to important clinical, research and policy quest.ions can depend in part on the 
e1tent to which one is justified in believiq that part.icular adverse clinical events were 
caused by specific drugs. For e1ample. should a clinician discontinue the use or an effective 
antlintlammatory drug in a patient to whom it may be causing anghial pain? How should a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer react to the fact that two patients in a clinical trial or a new 
antiulcer drug developed liver disease? Should a trial or a new heart failure drug be 
terminated because r our or nine patients on the drug died suddenly within tbe first three 
months or treatment? How should an epidemiologist studylna the incidence or in-hospital 
iatrogenic diseases decide whether a particular case of renal failure is drug-induced? 
All these questions involve the causality assessment problem: given all the available 
information. what is the probability that a given adverse clinical event was caused by some 
particular drus to which the patient had been e1posed7 In a previous paper (14). we 
developed criteria that methods for solvins the causality assessment problem should satisfy, 
an~ we argued that no current method satisfied these criteria. In this paper, we describe a 
new approach to the causality assessment problem, and we show that tbJs approach satisfies 
the criteria discussed in (14i). Ideas related to the new approach can be round in (13) and (1). 
The new approach is based on Bayesian probability theory. In section l, we e1plain the 
essential ideas of this theory and present reasons why it should be applied in the causality 
assessment conte1t. The new approach is developed in sections 2 and 3; in section 4 it is 
applied to a case in which amo1icillin is suspected or causing diarrhea; and in section 5. it is 
discussed in relation to the criteria of ( 14). 
I. Ptobabilily, Coherence and Cau1a111y ••se•• .. eat 
We believe that two r eatures of the causality assessment problem oontribute substantially 
to its difficulty. The first of these is uncertainty. The assessor is usually uncertain about 
many of tho koy olomonts ho must integrate into bis assessment. His uncertainty may be 
about some of the facts of tbe case ( did the patient actually take drug D before event B 
began? has the patient ever e1perienced an event similar to B before?); about backsround 
information that affects how these facts are to be interpreted (how long should it take before 
to1ic quantities or tbe relevant metabolite or D have accumulated at the target organ? what is 
tbe incidence or events like E in patients simllar to the present one. but who have not taken 
D?); or about the assumptions that it is appropriate to make when determining the 
evidentiary signll'icance of the clinical data Ur E is an adverse reaction to D. is the mechanism 
dose-dependent or immunologic? could E be a clinical sequela or the disease ror wruch the 
patient is taklng D as treatment?). Somehow. the assessor must take into account this 
uncertain information and the e1tent of his uncertainty when be evaluates the probability 
that D caused E. 
The second feature bas to do with the comQ1e1ity or the information that IIT~s causality 
assessment. There is always more than one stream or evidence that must be merged in any 
causality assessment problem. Several dilTerent factors are relevant io any causality 
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11ssessment problem, ~d the evidence about each of tbem usually comes from several 
different sources. The factors include bact,1round incidence or events lite E (in patients who 
had previously taken D, u well as in those who bad not), aspects of the patient's history 
(including previous e1perience with drugs similar lo D and events similar to B. as well as 
demographic and genetic informatJon)r timloa or the event in relation to administration of D, 
clinical characteristics or the event (including drug levels in tissues or body nuidi), and the 
patient·, response to dechalleue (withdrawal of D) or rechaJleoae (readministration or D). 
when these occur. Information sources include the assessor's previous clinical e1perience and 
bis clinical judgement. clinical observations and laboratory findings on the patient in 
question. data rrom epldemlologlc studies. as well as racts and theories Crom pharmacology 
and other basic sciences. Frequently, information from one source or about one factor 
conflicts with information from another source or about another factor. Even when the 
information is not mutually contradictory, some way must be found to weigh the significance 
of each of the pieces and combine these "weights of evidence" in a reasonable way. 
Both of these problems can be addressed with the help of Bayesian probability theory. 
This theory provides a set or normative rules ror reasoning in the face or uncertainty. The 
rules are not arbitrary. in the following sense: violate them. and you act like someone who 
simply throws money away. with no gain to hlmsetr. On tbe other band. while following the 
irules guarantees that one will acl. consistently with his own opinions about matters relevant 
to the problem at hand, it does not ensure that these opinions are correct. Fortunately. 
treating the causality assessment problem from a Bayesian point or view bas an additional 
benefit: the method provides a unique and logical connect.ion between the overall causality 
assessment and a set of other judgements that are subject. at least in principle, to empirical 
checks. so that the assessor can (again. in principle and with patience) discover if he is wise 
as well as consistent. The rest of this section elaborates on the claims presented in this 
paragraph. 
We begin with a definition of "probability." As we explained in U 4), we regard probability 
as a subjective measure or degree of belief. In causality assessment, as in many other real-
world problems, the ultimate goal is to decide how to G1 when faced with uncertainty. Thus, 
the aepect of belief that we would like probability to measure is the subject's propensity to 
act as though the proposition whose probability he is evaluating is true. One way to achieve 
this, following the pioneering work of the Italian mathematician Bruno de Pinetti (4.5). is to 
reduce the assessment of uncertainty to an economic decision, where the acts to be taken and 
the values or their consequences are clear. To this end, evaluate the probability for you of a 
proposition A according to the following thought experiment: decide upon a number p such 
that you are neutral between buying and selling for Sp a ticket that will be worth SI if A is 
true and otherwise it will be worth nothing; this number p is your probability that A is true 
(you must imagine that at some specified time in the future, you will find out (or sure 
whether A is or is not true). •. 
Note that if you are sure that A is true. p must be 1, and if you are sure that A is ratse. P 
must be zero: otherwise. there is a unique number p between O and 1 satisl'y.ina the 
definition (for any number areater than p, tile price is too hlah, and you would be unwllllna 
to llllI the ticket; while you would not agree 10 all the ticket for less Ulan p). Thus. although 
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it may be difficult to determine p e1actly, Just as it is difficult to declde e1adly how mucb 
you would be wlllina to pay ror a new house. in principle both quantities e1ist. and. at the 
least, bounds on both could be determined by how you act when bettina or neaot.iatina for 
the house. 
Some people find it easier to think about odds than probability. Giving 3 to l odds in favor 
or A is exactly the same as setting its probability at 314 ; generally, a probability or p is 
equivalent to (favoring) odds or p/( 1 - p ). 
With de Finetti's definition of probability, it is possible to aiVe a precise meaning to 
inconsistent reasoning in the race of uncertainty. Suppose you simultaneously assess the 
uncertainty you reel about many dllTerent propositions tbat are related Jn _various way•. 
Using de Pinetti's. definition as your measure of uncertainty, you have therefore 
simultaneously set the price for many tickets. Is it possible, in principle, that someone could 
transact with you for some or these, at your prices, in such a way that you must pay out more 
than you receive from him, no matter which of the proposjtions are true and which false?• If 
so, in your assessments you have in effect made economic decisions with unacceptable 
economic consequence, certain financial loss. The possibility of such Joss is a concretization of 
the inconsistent reagipg that underlies it. 
A set of bets that makes money no matter what happens is called a Dutch book in gambling 
circles. The rules of Bayesian probability theory auarantee that all your probability 
assessments fit together in such a way that a Dutch book cannot be made against you. In this 
sense, you either reason about uncertainty consistently with these rules -- or you act like 
someone who is willing to give money away without any chance of getting it back. And, s.ince 
your probabilities for the various propositions oill whether you determine them or not, this 
result remains true whether you e:s:plicitly and quantitatively assess your uncertainty or you 
just do it implicitly and qualitatively, as in most current approaches to causality assessment. 
A set of probability assessments that is consistent with the rules is called mherent; any 
reasoning about uncertainty that is not consistent with any coherent set of probability 
assessments is called incoherent. 
To describe the rules of Bayesian probability theory, we need to introduce one more 
concept, conditional probability. To understand the idea of cxmditionioss suppose you are 
considering whether or not to purchase a house that you have just hired a structural engineer 
to examine. The price you would be willing to pay for the house will depend on whether the 
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·As an example, suppose A represents the proposition t.bat it will ram tomorrow, and Ac 
that it will JlOl rain tomorrow. There is nothing inherently wrong with assessing P(A) • 0.25, 
nor with assessing P(Ac) • 0.25 (though either one taken alone could well be unwise -- say, in 
a desert or a rain-forest). On the other hand, it is clearly inconsistent to assess 12.mh 
quantities as 0.25: if you did so, and sold tickets at the assessed prices, someone could buy 
one or each ticket for a total outlay of SOI -- and give them back to you today demanding S l 
in return, since one or the other proposition is bound to be true tomorrow. and hence one of 
the tickets must be worth S 1, while the other will be worth nothing. The SOt sure loss you, 
the assessor, race in this situation reveals the incoasistency in tbe simultaneous assessments 
or 0.25 for the two probabilities P(A) and P(Ac). 
engineer's report ii favorable or not Thus, to decide bow to proceed in your neaotiations, 
you could now determine a price you would be wllllna to pay assuming the engineer 
produces a favorable report and a price assuming an unfavorable report. These are 
conditional prices. They become operative when a specif'ied condition ls round to be true. IC 
the condition turns out to be false, the price determined conditionally on its tr~lh becomes 
irrelevant 
The same idea applies in the probability assessment conte:it. Informally, the conditional 
probability of a proposition A given a proposition B, denoted P(AIB), is the degree of belief 
that the assessor has in A if he agrees to assume that Bis true (that is, if he acts as though he 
is certain about B). Formally. we can define P(AIB) as the price or a ticket worth SI if both A 
and B are true, worth nothing il' B is true and A is false, and the purchase price is refunded 
and the bet called off if B turns out to be false (that is, the bet is made conditionally on the 
truth of B ). All probabilities are really conditional probabilities, since the assessor always 
conditions on everything that he believes to be true with certainty (that is. the unconditional 
probability P(A) is the same as P(AIB). where "B" refers to the facts and opinions that the 
assessor regards as true and on the basis of which he determines his uncertainty about A). 
Sometimes. we consider probabilltes that are conditional on more than one proposition. 
Por e1ample. "P(AIB and C)" or equjvaJently "P(AIB,C)" denotes the probability or A given B 
ID.d C. and it represents the price for a bet on the truth of A that is called off unless IHnb. B 
and C turn out to be true. When reading probability notations. remember that everything 
inside the parentheses to the left of the "I" is part of the proposition about which the assessor 
is measuring his uncertainty. and everything to the right of the "I" represents a proposition 
that, for the purposes of that particular assessment, the assessor is regarding as certainly 
true. 
Now we can state the main result of Bayesian probability theory. Denote by .. B .. everything 
that the assessor regards as true with certainty. Then a collection or probability assessments 
is coherent if and only if the following three conditions hold: 
1) The Norm@Uzation f,ondition: For every proposition A. P(AIB) must be between O and 
I, inclusive. 
2) The Additivity r,ondition: If A and Care mutually contradictory propositions, 
P(A or CI B) • P(AIB) + P(CIB). 
3) The Multiplicative f,ondition: For any propositions A and C. 
P(A and CI B) .. P(AIB) 1 P(QA and B) 
• P(QB) 1 P(AIB ud C). 
Here are two important consequences or these conditions tbat we shall use repeatedly in 
what follows: 
t) Bayes· Ibeorem: Por any propositions A and c 1ucb that P(QB) > o. 
or equivalently, 
P(AIB and C) - PlAIBl I P{QA pd B) , 
P(QB) 
P{AIB and Cl • P{AIBl I J>fQA and B} • 
P(AclB and C) P(AclB) P(QAc and B) 
5 
where Ac is the proposition that states that A is false. The second e1pression of Bayes· 
Theorem is in odds form; the left-hand side is called the posterior odds in favor of A (that 
is. posterior to C). the first term on the right-hand side is called the prior odds in favor of 
A. (that is, prior to C), and the second term on the riaht-hand side is called the likelihood 
wm. 
2) The Law or Total Probability: Suppose A1, A2, -, A0 are mutually contradictory 
propositions such that one of them must be true. Then for any proposition C, 
P(QB) • (P(CIB and A1) I P<A11B)) + - + (P(CIB and An) I P(A8IB)I. 
Bayes· Tbeorem follows from the second equality in tbe multiplicative condition. and the Law 
of Total Probability follows from the additive and multiplicative conditions taken together. 
See appenda l for a detailed derivation or these two results. 
How do these results help us address the causality assessment problem? First, the 
causality assessment problem itself is just a special kind of conditional probability evaluation. 
Given all available case and background information, one is required to asee11 hi• probability 
for the proposition that the drug D caused the event E (which we shall hereafter denote as "D-
>K'). To evaluate this probability, one must take into account all the data that matter, as well 
as what it is that makes them significant. According to the Bayesian tbeory, to reason· 
coherently about all these things, one should first decompose the "global" causality 
assessment problem into a series of component problems, each of which deals only with 
information about one factor or source or information. For each or these simpler problem1, 
one must measure bis uncertainty about the facts and their evidentiary significance usiq de 
Pinetti's definition of probability. Finally, the theory shows that there is only one way to 
piece together the solutions to these component problems into a coherent overall causality 
assessment, and that is to use Bayes· Theorem and the Law or Total Probability. Tbus, the 
lheory prescribes bow we should deal witb uncerllinty and bow we must merae dlll'erent 
streams or evidence. and it points up the penalty should we fail io follow its prescription: we 
will necessarily realOfl, and act, incoherently. 
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Tbere ls still one Import.ant Issue to address: bow can you tnow Ir a probabWty appraJsal 
is "r.iabt"? If probabWty measures subjective dearee d belief. Ulen this question seems 
meaningless (unless it addresses the problem or how someone else could determine whether 
the assessor is honestly announcing his real oplnJons. a problem that we shall not take up 
here). But this ls not the end of the story. since probabWties of propositions about future 
observables can be converted into predictions about the values that these observables will 
a11ume. and the validity or the predictions can be subjected to empirical checks. For 
e1ample, suppose two different coherent probability assessment methods are used to produce 
probabilities for a set or propositions about future observables, and one method amsistently 
assJgns lliaber probabilities to tbe propositions tbat turn out to be true. and lower 
K>robabilities to the ones that turn out false. 1.han the other method. Then it seems reasonable 
to conclude that even though both methods are coherent. one or the methods is more in tune 
with the world than the other. and in the future (everything else remainiq reasonably the 
same). one would want to modify his own opinions to concur with probabilities 1enerated by 
that method rather than by its less effective alternative. 
Now the proposition "D->E". whose probability It is the business or causality assessment to 
evaluate. ls certainly not about any future observable. It ls retrodictive rather than 
predictive in character. and typically whether D actually caused B in that particular case or 
not will never be known with certainty. Thus. the validity or a causality assessment method 
is not subject to a direct empirical check. in which the probabilities it produces are converted 
into predictions and the accuracy or these predictions is determined. Nonetheless. using 
Bayes' Theorem. it is possible to convert the causality assessment problem into a series of 
probability assessments. the propositions in each of which are about the values of future 
observables. This conversion will be achieved in the third section of this paper. Its 
implications are e1tremely important: in principle, the Bayesian approach to causality 
assessment allows lbe logical incorporation or a series or metbod• for evaluating components 
or the overall uncertainty about drug causation. and each or the ilrethods can be subjected to 
empirical tests of its soundness.2 
We conclude this section with a discussion of a frequently-raised objection to the use of 
probability theory for problems like causality assessment. Many people believe that it is 
impossible to assign a definite number to their uncertainty about the truth or a proposition. 
When asked, for e1ample, what is the chance that a patient with a certain clinical condition 
treated in a particular way will e1perience some particular untoward clinical event in some 
specified time period, they respond that they just do not kooW: to attach a number to their 
uncertainty would be to introduce a meaninaless and false precision to somethlna essentially 
vague and even unknowable. We believe that this position is incorrect. for the following 
three reasons: 
1) u,1n, de Pinetti's definition or probability, the precision 1o measurtoa probability is 
not falg. There is certainly some justice in applyJns the cbarae of false precision to some 
2 We hasten to point out that these methods have yet to be developed; to the e:nent that the 
Bayesian approach can prove its value in appli~tions, we are confident that they will be. 
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previous quantltallve approaches to causality assessment that bave used uncalibrated, 
analogue probability-Ute scales ranaina rrom Oto l (or 100) (12.19). ror which lhe 
result.in& numbers have no clear interpretation and hence no real meaning (u discussed in 
(191). But this is not true ror the ideas developed in this paper, since the de Ymetti 
definition alves a precise meaning to the measurement or uncertainty. Furlhermore, 
Bayesian probability theory shows how optimal decision-making in the face or uncertainty 
depends precisely on probabilities defined in this way ( 15). In addition. any optimal 
decision must be consistent with some coherent set ol probability assessments for the . 
relevant uncertain outcomes. whether these assessments are made e1puc1tty or not. or 
course. the chance tbat a set or assessments that are made implicitly are actually coherent 
is exceedingly remote. 
On the other hand, it is true that the theory does not solve the problem of elicitios 
probabilities, any more than the tact that there is a price at which you would just be 
willing to buy a new house allows you to determine without further ado what that price is. 
There is much work to be done on the elicitation problem, although many useful ideas and 
techniques already e1ist (for some of them, see the discussion of 'Tactics" in section 3 
below). 
2) Ir the purpose or the causality assessment is to auide particular decisions. it is not 
necessary to evaluate each component probability precisely. As we shall show in section 
3. a Bayesian causality assessment requires the evaluation of the probabilities of several · 
. different propositions. Suppose an assessor determines that his probability for one of_ 
these propositions lies somewhere between two numbers, say 1/3 and 1/2, but he finds it 
very difficult to evaluate it more specifically. It is always possible to go through the 
entire causality assessment, plugging in 1 /3 wherever the probability in question appears, 
and then repeat tbe analysis usina 1 /2 instead. If the over~ causality assessment is not 
very different, then there is no need to evaluate this particular probability more precisely. 
IC it is, and some contemplated decision might binge on the difference, then further wort 
is unavoidable. The point is that such "sensitivity analyses" can always be carried out, 
with respect to the probabilities that prove to be the most difficult to assess; if it turns out 
to make no real difference which number in a certain range is used, then there is no need 
to introduce what seems like an arbitrary precision. If it ·matters, some creative tinkerina 
using Bayes· Theorem, the Law or Total Probability or some other device is necessary to 
solve the problem. 
3) What is the atteroative to auantifylna uocerteioty? It is hard to see how the 
evidence about different factors and from dllTerent sources can be weighed and merged ~ 
a reasonable and nonarbitrary way without usma quantitative methods that start with the 
eiplicit measurement of uncertainty. r.ettainly, as we argued in 114), no qualitative 
methods yet developed bave come close to achieving this goal. 
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2. f,oUecliDR Uae flc:&I 
The first step in the Bayesian approach is to collect the facts cl the case. The assessor is 
required to identify the patient '1 clinical condition preceding the onset of the adverse event. 
the type of adverse event, the possible causes or the event. and the details or the evolution of 
the event: 
n > Identify the cJtn!saJ mndltion M and the type or the adyene event Bt-
M is a "generic" specification or the disease for which the patient is underaoma treatment. 
along with known co-morbidity (for e1ample, M might denote pneumococcaJ pneumonia or 
stage four congestive heart failure). Et is the "generic" type or the adverse event (for 
e1ample, gastric ulcer or aplastic anemia). not a detailed description of tbe particular-case at 
hand. which is denoted by B. Clearly, there is quite a bit or latitude in how specific these 
identifications can be; the important point is that they should be made explicitly at the 
beginning or the assessment. and thereafter whenever the assessment refers to "M" or "Et" 
the meaning should remain the same. (Some guidelines for spedfying Mand Et are presented 
m section 3 b~low.) 
2) Ljst the possible causes ror the adverse event R 
The list should include possible drug causes (D1 to D8), the clinical condition M, nondru1 
treatment modalities. environmental e1posures, and. of course, the possibility of some 
"unknown" cause. 
It is necessary to clarify what it means to say that somethina .. causes B". The causes of 
primary interest in the causality assessment problem are drug causes: the proposition "D -> 
E" is true if B would not have happened as and when it did had D not been administered: this 
does not preclude the possibility that some attributes of the clinical condition M were also 
necessary for B to occur. The Bayesian approach requires that the alternative etiologies be 
Jlisted in such a way that the elements of the list are mutually e1clusive and e1haustive. 
Thus, if the listed possible causes are the drug D. the clinical condition M and "unknown''. then 
the proposition "M -> B" means not only that B was a sequela to M, but also that B would have 
happened even if D bad not been administered. That is, D-causation includes the possibility 
or an "interaction" between D and M, while M-causation e1pressly rules out D involvement. 
Suspected drug interactions must be specJfically Jnmrporated into the list or possible 
causes. More precisely, when there is more than one drua causal candidate, if an interaction 
between drugs D1 and D2 is considered a priori as a possible cause, the list must include the 
hypotheses (D1 alone), (DJ alone) and (D1 and~ jointly). 
The list or causes is important in the Bayesian approacb, sJnce the approach works by 
partitJonina the total probability, 1. amona the various causal hypotheses. aiven all the 
elicited evidence. Thus. if a new etioloaical candidate is introduced to the list of causes, the 
causality assessment can cb1n1~. 
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3 > Bemrd the retevant detajt• about the case at band. 
It is most convenient to think about the case information that needs to recorded in terms 
of the cbronotay or time-course of the event B. an e1ample of which can be illustrated·•• 
follows: 
ti me _ _____,.) 
f\ A A A A A 
M D E Dechellenge £ Rech811enge 
diagnosed therapy detected clears 
Hi Ch De ~ 
Ti 
The symbols Hi, Ti, Cb. De and Re. which ref er to different cbronologlcal classes or case 
information, are defined as follows: 
Hi (historical information) contams information about the current patient that antedates 
the clinical episode initiated by B. Typically. Hi might include data about previous 
e1periences with the suspect (and related) drugs and special demographic. behavioral, clinical 
or genetic risk classes for events of type Bi to which the patient belongs. 
Ti describes the time or onset of Bin relation to the administration of the drugs the patient 
has received, including when available the time-course or prodromal events like subclinical 
findings and early clinical signs and symptoms. 
Ch (characteristics of B) refers to the period between the times or onset and dechallenge (or 
E clears, if no dechallenge occurs). Cb might indude data about drug levels in tissues or body 
fJuids as well as other details in clinical presentation, laboratory results, pathological findiqs 
or time-course that allow B to be more precisely described or classified. 
De and Re refer to events in time periods initiated by decballen,Re and recballeme with the 
suspect druas. when these occur. With respect to withdrawal or a particular drua D. De 
typically includes whether the symptoms associated with B abate when D is withdrawn (or its 
10 
dosaae reduced), and, if so, the time-course and clinical characteristics or this response. 
Similarly. Re typically records whether an event or type E reappears f ollowma rechallenge. as 
well as the time it takes for this to happen if it does and any characteristics of the new event 
that provide differential etiological information. IC a second dechallenge occurs following a 
positive response to rechallenge, a new class of information. De2, must be introduced; 
similarly, Re2, De3 and so on may be necessary. In each case, all information about events in 
the relevant time period that can help distinsuish between the various etiological candidates 
should be included in the appropriate chronological class. 
The Bayesian approach requires the assessor to list what he knows about the case 
information in each of these classes. in response to the prompts given in Table 1 below (the 
questions in Table 1 are posed with respect to a particular suspect drug D: if more than one 
drug is a possible cause or D, repeat the questions with respect to each of them3). It is 
important to reanze that the quantity or information in each or tbese five classes can vary 
widely from case to case. In particular. for most cases Hi and Ti contain important and 
sometimes abundant data. On the other hand, many events are irreversible, and so 
dechallenge and rechalleqe cannot occur. Even if Eis reversible, it may be sufficiently 
serious that recballenge is not ethically feasible and so does not take place. 
TABLE l GOFS HERE 
3. IY1Juatiu the Bvidence 
After the facts have been collected, their evidentiary significance must be assessed. In this 
section we describe the 8211 of this assessment and the Bayesian strategy for achieving this 
goal.·. We also consider some tactics for 1mplementing the Bayesian strategy. 
Ihe Goat 
According to the Bayesian approach. the IDllof causality assessment can be defined in the 
r ollowing way: for a drug D suspected as a cause of the adverse event B. calculate the 
posterior odds in favor of D-causation, 
(l) P<D->B I B, C) • p{D->B I B,Cl . 
1 - P(D->E I B,C) P(DJ4E I B,C) 
Here~ 0 D/>B" represents the proposition that the drug D did not cause the event B; that is, that 
Jg would have occurred as and when it did even if D had not been administered. C is the ~ 
5 See appendil 2 for a 1eneral technique for dealina with cases that have more than one 
possible drug cause, by considering a series or problems, each or which has only a smale drug 
in its cause list. 
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information (tbat is. Iii. Ti, Cb, De. and Re) described in tbe previous section. and B is 
background in[ormatlon,. B contains the ract tbat in tbe case at band an event or type ~ bas 
occurred in a patient with clinical condition M at some time after tile drugs on the list d 
possible causes have been administered in a specified way. Unlite the case-s~ic 
information in C, the information in B makes no further reference 1o the particular patient 
whose case is currenUy undergoing assessment. In addition. B contains all the background 
information that the assessor might bring to bear to analyze any such case. includiq . 
information about the drugs. their pharmacology and kinetics. indications. and risk factors 
that alter the chance or adverse effects. 
The Strate&Y 
Using de Pinetti's measure, one could evaluate directly the probabilities in the numerator 
and denominator of the posterior odds displayed in equation (t). but, given the comple1ity d 
most causality assessment problems. such an act or global introspection could almost never be 
carried out consistently with all the opinions one bolds about the meaning and relevance of 
the information in Band C. Tbus. an alternative approach to the evaluation of the posterior 
odds is required. The strategy we adopt is to use the rules of Bayesian probability theory to 
decompose the posterior odds into a series or component factors, each of which require 
probability evaluations for propositions much more specific and accessible to the e1perience 
and knowledge of the evaluator than the proposition "D->E", and which are in principle 
subject to "predictive validity" tests as described in section 1 above. Once these component 
evaluations are carried out, there is only one coherent way to combine them to calculate·'the 
posterior odds in favor of D-causation, and that way is e1hibited in equation (7). below. · 
We do not mean to imply that each of the component probability evatuations0 are 
"automatic". They may require a lot of thought, and the assessor may be rar from confident 
in his answers. Nonetheless, we believe that these evaluations are addressable problems. and 
future work should lead to better techniques for their solution. 
Strategy Step t; Reduce to a Single Suspect Drug D 
In many cases. the list of possible causes will include more than one drug or drug 
interaction. The first step in tbe Bayesian approach is to restrict to the case in which there is 
only one suspect drug, which we shall denote by D. This restriction involves no loss of 
generality, as we show in appendil 2 at the end or tbis paper (the reason is that Bayes· 
Theorem can be used to coherently merge the solutions or the causality assessment problems 
that arise when each suspect drug is treated in turn as though it were the only possible cause. 
into a solution to the overall assessment problem). 
Strategy Step 2: Coherently Decompose the Posterior Odds 
We now turn to the Bayesian decomposition of tbe posterior odds. Tbe first part or this 
step ls to apply Bayes· Theorem in odds form. as presented in section t: 
P(D -> B I B. C) P(D -> B I B) 
(2) --------------- • ------------- z 
P(D+> EI B, C) P(D-1+ EI B) 
posterior odds prior odds 
P(C ID-> B. B) 
P(CID~B.B) 
likelihood ratio 
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The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2), the prior odds, gives the odds in 
r avor or drug cau~ation taking into account just background information and disregarding any 
details about this particular patient and his adverse evenl The second term on the right-
hand side, the likelihood ratio, compares how likely are the details observed in tbls particular 
case under two competing etioloaical hypotheses: that the drug did and did not cause the 
adverse event B. 
The advantage gained by the decomposition in equation (2) derives from the following 
consideration. As we have seen, the probabilities in the posterior odds ref er to inherently 
unverifiable propositions: that the particular event B was or was not caused by D. On the 
other hand, the propositions whose probabilities appear in the prior odds and in the 
likelihood ratio are closely linked to predictive probabilities that can in principle be 
validated. We shall show how this applies to the likelihood ratio later; we now turn to the 
connection between the prior odds and predictive probabilities. 
First. note that there is an important difference between the posterior and prior odds 
ter~s. Since .both are evaluated cxmditionally on B. they both refer to a patient with clinical 
condition M who has been ad ministered drug D in a particular way and who has at some · 
unspecified time thereafter e1perienced an event or type Bi- However, the identity of the 
patient to whom the statements ref er is different in the two ter.-is. In the posterior odds, it 
is the particular patient for whom the causality assessment is being carried out, while in the 
prior odds it is a 111eneric" patient (for e:iample, the "ne1t" patient with .M who suffers an 
event of this type after receiving D, for e1ample) with the three defining properties -- clinical 
condition M, e1posure to D and adverse event or type Jsi. To reinforce this distinction, we 
shall substitute the e1pression "D->Bt11 for "D->B11 when the proposition refers to the "generic" 
patient with the definina characteristics rather than the particular patient at hand. 
To see the connection between prior odds and predictive probabilities most clearly, it is 
easiest to focus on a spedal case. Imagine that records are available for a large group or 
patients with cllnical condition M, and that the subaroup consistma or Ulose patients who 
have received D is similar to the subgroup who have not, with respect to the distribution or 
any variables that are proanostic for the occurrence of events or type 1ft (e1cept, of course, for 
e1posure io D). 
The incidence of events of type Rt among those patients who take D is the sum or two 
components: lbe incidence or the events caused by D and the incidence or events not caused 
by D. Since the patients taking and not taking Dare otherwise prognostically equivalent. the 
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lnddence or events not caused by D 1n tbe patients takiDI D is lbe •me as the incidence or Ill 
the events of type Et in the patients not taking D. Since the prior probability that an event is 
caused by D is just the ratio or the incidence or events caused by-D to the overall incidence or 
e\fents among patients who receive D. we can summarize tbls discussion by tbe rollowina 
equation•: 
(3) 
P(BtlD) - P(Btll)C) 
P<D->P-t I B) • -------------------
P<BtlD) 
• 1 - (P(Etll)C)IP(BtlD)) 
where P<BtlD) is the probability that a patient who received D will e1perience an event or 
type Et, and P(Etll)c) is the probability that a patient who did not receive D will e1perience an 
event or this type. Both these probabilities clearly generate predict.ions of the incidence ot 
events or type Et, among future patients with M who do and do not receive D. 
Usually, or course, tbe patients who do and do not receive Dare not otherwise 
prognostically equivalent with respect to events of type Et- Although more work is required 
to interpret P(D->EtlB) in terms of predictive probabilities in these cases. the principle th•t 
relates this probability to future incidences remains in force. 
Now consider the probabilities in the numerator and denominator ot the likelihood ratio. 
These call for an assessment of the probability that particular case details will occur, given 
that the event is and is not caused by the drug D. These probabilities are clearly about future 
observables (for the details of the 11ne1t" event of type Et following administration of D to a 
patient with M), but since they are evaluated conditionally on an unobservable cause. they do 
not directly generate 0 validatable" predictions. But that problem is easily r~medied. The Law 
or Total Probability can be used to combine the probabilities appearing in tbe likelihood ratio 
with the probabilities appearing in the prior odds, as r ollows: 
( ~) P(QB) = (P(QB,D->B) I P(D->EIB)) + (P(CIB.1)/>B) I P(D/>EIB)}. 
(Here, C refers to case details identical to the ones observed for the particular patient who 
e1perienced the event B.) 
The probability on the left of equation (4) is a predictive probability, e1pressing the 
probability that the "ne1t" patient with M who is administered D and e1periences an event or 
type Et will manlf est case details C. while the four probabilities on tile riaht are the 
components of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio. Since tbe prior odds components. P(D-
4 In odds rorm. 
P(D->BtlB)/P(Dl>BtlB) • (P(BtlD) - P(Btll)c)) / P(Btll)c). 
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>BIB) .and P(D/>EIB). are assessable In terms of predictive probabWtles and thus Independently 
-Valldatable ... equation ( 4') provides a predictive check ror the utellhood ratJo component 
probabilities. 
We now turn to a further decomposition or the lltellhood ratio. Trying to evaluate the 
probability or all the details in C simultaneously is too hard. since there is too much to think 
11bout at once. Therefore, repeatedly using the multiplicative condition for conditional 
probabilities given in section 1, we shall decompose the likelihood ratio into a series or factors 
each involving probabilities for propositions about only one or the five chronological classes 
Hi, Ti, Cb, De and Re: 
P(C ID-> B. B) 
(5) ---------------- • LR(Hi) I LR(Ti) I LR(Ch) I LR(De) I LR(Re) 
P(C ·1 04> B. B) 
Here, for example. 
P(Hi ID -> B. B) 
(6) LR(Hi) • ----------------- : 
P(Hi ID+> B. B) 
P(Ti ID-> B. B, Hi) 
LR(Ti) • --------------------- and 
P(Ti I D-1-> E, B, Hi) 
P(De I D -> B, B, Hi, Ti, Cb) 
LR(De) • ---------------------------
P(De I ~> B. B. Hi. Ti, Cb) 
Un words. LR(Hj) might be called the likelihood ratio factor evaluating historical information, 
and LR(De) the likelihood ratio factor evaluating decballenge information, and so forth. The 
order in which these ractors appear in equation (5) (and which factors appear as conditioning 
sets) is determined by chronology. 
Putting equations (2) and (S) together gives the Bayesian decomposition or the posterior 
odds into the prior odds and five likelihood ratio factors: 
P(D->BIB,C) 
(7) 
----~------- -
P(~BIB.C) 
P(D->BIB) 
----------- I LR(Hi) I LR(Ti) 1 LR(Cb) 1 LR(De) J LR(Re) 
P(MBIB) 
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Tactics; TtGbolgues ror 1mptemen1to1 tbe Bayesian Stratny 
In this section. we address the key tactical question ror the Bayesian approach: how can 
an assessor evaluate the prior odds and the llkelibood ratio factors? We begin by presentina 
some guidelines ror defining M and Rt that make some or the probability evaluations easier. 
Nezt. we discuss four useful general techniques for evaluatina probabilities. Finally, we offer 
specific suaestions for evaluatina each or tbe sil terms on the right-band side or equation 
(7). 
Warnipa: some readers may find some of the ideas in this section rough 1oq. In such 
cases, it is probably best to skip or skim the section at the fJrst readina and 10 directly to the 
e1ampJe in section ~-
Defining M and Et 
The Bayesian strategy requires that the patient's clinical condition Mand the type or 
adverse event Bi be unambiguously defined and that the dermitions then be-consistently 
applied in every subsequent probability evaluation. The level or specificity of these 
definitions can make a difference in how easy it is to carry out probability evaluations hl 
which they play a role. 
In particular, it is usually a aood idea to attach a definite time horizon to the definition of 
the event type (that is, the definition or the event type is modified to include the 
requirement that the event occur sometime within a filed amount or time -- the time horiZon 
-- after the first administration of D). The role or the time horizon in the analysis is to 
separate the event under consideration from possible fuiure occurrences of the same type of 
event. It is particularly useful in assessing the prior odds and the distribution for time to 
onset of the event as a function of the cause of the event. As a rule of thumb, we usually 
take as the horizon for a relatively common event a period at least as loDB as a .. reasonable" 
time period for the event to occur as an adverse reaction to the suspect drug D, while for an 
uncommon event the horizon might be much longer. For e%ample, if the event is diarrhea (as 
in the example in section 4). an appropriate time horizon might be one or two weeks, while if 
the event is Stevens-Johnson syndrome the horizon might be one year. The time horizon 
chosen can facilitate the assessment, but it does not affect the evaluation of the posterior 
odds in favor or drug causation.5 
The assessor faces a choice between puttina certain details or the patient's clinical 
condition into the definiton of M and placing them in Hi, which records information about the 
' More accurately, ve should say it should not afTect the evaluation, and would got, if the 
assessor were coherent. Changing the time horizon will change the values or the different 
components or the posterior odds, but the chuaes compensate (for e11mple, ahortenina the 
time horizon typically ina-eases the prior odds Jn favor or drua cauaatiOD, but lowers tbe 
likelihood ratio ror timma proportionately). 
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patJenrs history before onset or E. Usually, the more aeneral ls I.be definition or M. I.be easier 
it is to assess the prior odds. but then the more specific becomes the information in Hi. and so 
the harder it is to assess LR(Hi). A useful rule is to include everything in M that is likely to 
have a substan1-at and relatively well-documented differential diaanostic effect (between D 
and non-D causation). For e1ample, in one case we have e1amlned, the patient wu about to 
undergo renal transplantation suraery when pubic lice were detected and [well shampoo ( 11 
aamma benzene he1achloride) applied. Biahteen hours alter surgery, the patient died or a 
sudden cardiac arrest In assessing lbe probabWty or ICweU-causatlon or the cardiac arrest, 
the patJent ·s renal f allure should certainly be included in M. even though it was not related to 
tbe tweU-tberapy. On the other band, Jn a case involving an atoplc patient who surrered 
Stevens-Johnson syndrome after undergoing sulfonamide treatment, the patient's atopy 
should be included in Hi rather than in the definition or M, because little information is 
available on the class of patients who are atopic and e1perience bacterial infections. 
General Techniaues ror Probability Evaluation 
Here are rour general techniques ror evaluatina probabllltles that can be used to 
advantage in the causality assessment conte1t.: 
f,onditionina: Sometimes, evaluating the probability of a proposition can aeem difficult 
because the assessor's thoughts about the proposition depend on which or several other 
propositions are true. For example, if an assessor wants to determine the probability that an 
event of type Et will occur as an adverse reaction to a drus D within a day of receiving a 
specified dosage of D, he might find that his assessment of this probability depends on the 
mechanism of the reaction (whether the reaction is immunologic or dose-dependent. for 
e1ample). Or again, in assessing the probability that an event of type Rt that is not caused by 
D will occur in a specified time period, the evaluator might want io consider separately each 
possible alternative cause for the event. 
In such cases, the Law of Total Probability can frequently be applied. First, the various 
possibilities on which the evaluation depends must be listed in such a way that one and only 
of one of them can be true (for example, the mechanism for the reaction may be immunologic, 
dose-dependent or "other"; or the alternative, nondrug causes for the event might be a viral 
infection for which the patient is being treated, some other, nondiagnosed infection or 
another, "unknown .. cause). Then, the assessor must evaluate the probability of the 
proposition in question. conditional on each listed possibility. Ne1t, he must evaluate the 
probability for each of the possibilities be has conditioned upon; this evaluation involves 
Jnherently unobservable propositions, but in our e1perienoe assessors often have little 
trouble partitionina their belier among a set or mutually contradictory mechanistic theories 
(the trickiest part is to decide how much probability to assign the catch-all "other" or 
.. untnown11). Finally, the assessor puts together these two sets d evaluations according to the 
formula given in section I as the Law of Total Probability. 
An e1ample or this procedure will be presented in section 4 below. 
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AnaloRy: As e1plained in section t. probability is Just a measure or tbe assessor's 
uncertainty. Tbus, it is sometimes possible ror an assessor to evaluate a probability ror a 
proposition by thinking about some *t, proposition about wbicb his uncertainty ii 
comparable and whose probability is easier to appraise. 
Por e1ample, suppose you believe that the pharmacotoaical mechanisms by·which two 
related dru1s can cause a part.Jcular kind or adverse reaction are very similar. Then it may 
be reasonable to suppose that the timing distributions for events ol this type as adverse 
reactions to the two drugs are similar (in parUcular. say, the probability that E occurs within 
one day arter recelvlng D1• given tbat D1 caused B. would be nearly tbe same as tbe same 
probablllty with respect to ~). But the assessor may have much more e1perlence with one or 
the drugs than with the other. in which case be might be quite confident about bis 
assessment or the timing distribution corresponding to the familiar dru1. which be can then 
transfer (perhaps with minor modil'Jcations) to the less ramillar one. 
As another e1ample, suppose an assessor needs to evaluate his probability that the ne1t 
infant receiving a course or therapy with a new "clllln" -type antibiotic drug will develop 
diarrhea. He can base this evaluation on t.he knowledge that reported incidences of diarrhea 
f ollowlng therapy with other drugs in this family raqe from about. 5 to 25 I, with a mode of 
about t 01 ( 10, 11 ); and so. if he is unaware of any r eature or the new dru1 that would 
distinguish it r rom others in its class with respect to its -propensity to cause diarrhea, he 
should assess the required probablllty. by analogy, at about 1/10. 
Preguencies: Sometimes, an assessor may have access to observed frequencies that are 
clearly relevant to a probability evaluation problem be is trying to solve. For e1ample, be 
might want to evaluate bis probability that the ne1t infant receiving a specified course of 
amo1icillin therapy will develop diarrhea, and he notes that a study monitoring outpatients in 
a large pediatric teaching hospital reported 130 cases of diarrhea out or 1320 patients within 
two days of beginning amo1icillin therapy (10). Should be necessarily evaluate bis 
probability as 1311327 
In general, the answer to this question is no. There are two primary reasons for this. The 
first has to do with the similarity between the patients for whom the probability evaluation 
is relevant and the patients upon whom the observed frequencies are based. The class of 
patients to which the probability evaluation refers is precisely specified by the conditions 
that appear to the right of tbe "I" in the statement of the probability: for e:iample, if the 
proba~ility in question is PCBtlD,M), the probability that a patient with clinical condition M 
who receives D in a specified way will e:iperience an event of type Rt, the class consists of all 
patients who have the clinical condition defined by M and receive the c:ourse or therapy 
denoted by D. Differences in such fact.ors as a1e, se1. severity of M, comorbidity, or the 
dosage of D, however, may compromise the applicability of frequencies reported in the 
literature to the specif le class of patients ror which probabilities are bemg assessed. 
The second reason that probabllities may differ from observed rrequendes has to do with 
chance variation. Bven if the patients about whom frequency information is available are 
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characterized precisely as required ror tbe probabWty evaluation problem, tbe probability 
and tbe observed rrequency need not coincide. since the observed frequency renects 10 some 
extent the vagaries or chance. especially if the sample size is small. 
Now if the frequency ml'ormation is based on patients m the class defined by the 
probability evaluation problem. and these patients have no other special definlq 
characteristics and their number is larae. then any coherent evaluation of the probability 
must be very close to the observed frequency. Otherwise. adjustments have to be made. 
O>rrect.ing for sample size is easy; dealing with the difference between the classes to which 
probability evaluation problems and observed frequencies refer is not. 
Informally. we suggest the following solution to the problem. Use observed frequencies. 
when available, to provide an "ancbor0 or initial solution to a probability evaluation problem. 
Then th.ink about the ways in which the dass to which the r requency inf'ormation refers 
differs from the class relevant to the probability evaluation, and decide what direction these 
differences suuest for chanalna the inital solution. (For e1ample, if the observed frequencies 
for diarrhea following amo1ocillin therapy were based only on inf ants in day-care centers, 
among whom one e1pects to find an elevated incidence of gastroenteritis. the frequencies 
should be adjusted downward to apply to tbe general inf ant population.) Finally, adjust the 
probability evaluation in the appropriate direction, perhaps using tbe conditionina or analOKY 
techniques if they apply. 
Sometimes, it is possible to use the connection between probability and frequencies to 
help evaluate probabilities. even when relevant observed frequencies are not available, by 
the following psychological ploy, the devjce of imaginary results. Suppose that an assessor 
has had a great deal of clinical experience with a particular kind or adverse event, and, for 
e1ample, he must evaluate the probability that an event or this type will occur within one 
day or beginning D-therapy, given that it occurs sometime in the month after the therapy 
begins. Such an assessor might find it useful to draw upon his e1perience by imaginlq a 
great number of patients in the relevant class who have- an event a month after beginning D-
therapy. and asking himself what proportion of those patients he thinks will experience the 
event in the first day. If he can answer this question, he should use thii proportion as bis 
answer to the required probability evaluation problem. 
Models: A model is a formal and general approach to probability evaluation. Models can 
be viewed as a systematic application or the ideas or conditionin& and analOKY. Because they 
can be constructed in accordance with the rules or probability theory, they give a framework 
for the coherent merger of different kinds of relevant information. As an example of the 
Jkind of model that would be helpful in the causality assessment context, th.ink of the time of 
onset of a dose-dependent adverse reaction to a drug D. This time cannot be predicted with 
certainty, but it depends in part on certain pharmacoloaical properties of the drug, 
physiological aspects of the reaction and specific attributes or the patient. A model for time 
to onset would specify how the mean reaction time depends on a particular set or drug-
event-patient parameters, and it would also specify tbe pattern or the residual variability 
(which is D01 determined by the specified parameters). It such a model were constructed. the 
causality assessor would only need to specify lbe values or the input parameters for the 
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particular cue at band. and be could then use tbe model to compute the probability that an 
event of type Bt caused by dru1 D would occur just when the event I underaoina assessment 
occurred (which is the numerator or the litellbood ratio ror timlna). 
Such models would be or 1reat benefit In lmptementina tbe Bayesian strategy. because 
they would reduce the number ol probability evaluations that an assessor would have to 
perform to carry out any particular causality assessment, they would substantially reduce the 
subjectivity In each or the remainina evaluations. and I.bey would permit aeneral predictive 
tests that would substantiate the models' and hence the whole Bayesian procedure·, validity. 
We do not yet have such models, but one of the great advantages or the Bayesian approach ia 
that it makes clear what models need to be developed, and it allows the incorporation or such 
models into the causality assessment procedure as they are developed. 
Eyatuatimz the Prior Odds 
Equation (3) provides. the most useful way to begin thinking about the prior odds. 
According to that equation, the prior odds can be regarded as a function of two incidence 
probabilities, PCBtlD) and P(Btll)C), the first 1ivina the incidence of events or type Bi amoq 
patients with M who receive the specified course of D-therapy. and the second giving the 
same incidence for an otherwise similar group of patients who do not receive D .. Usually, such 
incidences are not known precisely. However, the assessor can always use the following 
tactic. whose precise formulation and probabilistic justification are presented in appendiI 3: 
first, he eipresses his uncertainty about the .. true .. incidences in the form of a probability 
distribution' for these two quantities: then, he uses the appropriate midpoints of these 
distributions (formally, their means -- see appendiJ 3) as bis probabilities P<EtlD) and P(Etll)C): 
finally, he computes the prior odds as a function of these probabilities according to the 
formula in equation (3).7 . 
It is frequently possible to employ this tactic in a more informal way, particularly when 
the assessor has access to reasonably extensive and relevant frequency information (as is 
often the case for the incidence of events of type Et when Dis not administered, because 
estimates for the incidence of such events in the general population can frequently be 
obtained from the medical literature). When such frequency estimates e1ist, they can be 
6 A probability distribution for the 11true .. incidence gives values for the assessor's 
probabilities P(a i •true• Incidence i b), for all a and b between O and l. A distribution is 
usually specified by means or a density function, a nonnegative function f defined on the 
interval (0,1 ), such that P(a i •true• Incidence i b) is obtained as the area under the graph 
or r between a and b (in particular, the total area under the araph of r is I ). 
7 In some cases. it might be easier to think about the difference P<BtlD) - P(Btl])C), rather than 
P(SilD). The difference represents the incidence or events or type Rt following administration 
or D that are caused by the drua. The tactic, suitably modified, can be applied to estimate the 
"true" dilTerence and the ''true .. Incidence or events when D is not administered and to 
calculate the prior odds according to equation (3) rrom these two quantities. 
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used to evaluate the relevant probabilities directly, without constructing distributions for the 
"true" incidences, as in the discussion above on the general relation between probabilities and 
frequencies. But the cautions issued there hold: the assessor may need to make adjustments 
to the observed frequencies, since be is interested in the incidence among patients with 
clinical condition M, not the general population. If patients with M are at greater or less than 
average risk for events of type Bi, the assessor needs to modify the general incidences 
accordingly. Also, if the use of the drug Dis high in the general population, the population 
incidence of events of type Et represent mixtures of the incidences with and without D, and 
some adjustment is necessary before the observed frequencies can be used to give estimates 
of P(EilOC) alone. 
Another informal method that sometimes works when information about the "true" 
incidence is sketchy involves applying the analogy technjque for evaluating probabilities. For 
example, the assessor may feel that the connection between the drug D and the event E of 
interest is in the same range as some other drug-event connections, whose incidence figures 
are reasonably well-estimated in the literature, and be can adjust these incidences figures to 
give his P(EilD ). 
But suppose neither of the informal substitution methods discussed in the previous two 
paragraphs works. and the assessor feels quite vague about what the 0 true" incidence for 
events of type E1 really is. As suggested in the first paragraph of this section, be should then 
try to assess a distribution that describes his uncertainty about the relevant "true"' incidence. 
For example, he might feel fairly sure that the "true" incidence for events of type Et following 
administration of Dis somewhere between. say, 1/1000 and 1/10.000, but he cannot 
discriminate any more finely than this. Assuming that his uncertainly is approximately 
uniform in the "order of magnitude" scale, the argument given in appendil 3 suggests that he 
should assess P(EilD) as 1 /2558 (this is the mean of a distribution that is uniform in the Jog, 
or order of magnitude, scale, between 1/1000 and 1/10,000 ). The point is that the fact that 
the assessor's information is quite diffuse does not preclude evaluating a prior odds that 
accurately reflects his uncertainty.8 
s Of course, when information is very diffuse and the assessor's opinion is correspondingly 
vague, his prior odds can change substantially jf he gets access to new data that allows the 
"true" incidence to be estimated much more sharply. This in no way implies that the kind of 
calculation described above is "wrong"; only that tbe value of new information can be high 
when little is known. 
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BvaJu1Uo1 the LlkelJhOQd RatJo factor• 
To evaluate the likelihood ratio factors, it is necessary to assess the probability for Ill tbe 
differentially diagnostic information elicited in response to the questions summariJ:ed in 
Table l, given the contradictory hypotheses that D did and did not cause the adverse event B. 
There is a conceptual difference between LR(Hi) and the other factors. Bach of the other 
factors involves thinking in the forward direction, from a cause to its observable effects, 
while the information in Hi occurred before the event B. and so it is more difficult to think 
about how likely it was to be the case. conditional on the cause or an event that occurred 
after it did. Thus. we discuss LR(Hi) first and then turn to a aeneral consideration or the 
other likelihood ratio r actors. 
LRCHH: The representation for LR(Hi) given in equation (6) requires the assessor to think 
in "reverse chronolOBY .. (conditioning on the cause of B to evaluate tbe probability cl events 
occurring before B). which is difficult. Thus, it is easier to think about LR(Hi) in terms of the 
r ollowing alternative representation, which is an immediate mnsequence or the multiplicative 
condition for conditional probabilities presented in section I: 
P(D->BIHi.B) / P(Df>BIHi.B) 
(8) LR(Hi) • ----------------------------
P(D->BIB) I P(D ~BIB) 
In words. LR(Hi) is just the ratio of the odds in r avor of drug causation taking into account the 
information in Hi (and no other case information) to the prior odds in fivor of drug causation 
(ignoring the information in Hi). Seen in this way. the information in Hi serves as an 
adjustment to the prior odds, based on additional information about the patient that predates 
the occurrence of B. In effect, the relevant "reference set" in which to place the patient shifts 
from the general set of patients with M who experience an event of type Et after the specified 
course of D-therapy, to those who share the same relevant history as the particular patient 
whose case is the subject of the assessment. 
The adjustments to the prior odds required to evaluate LR(Hi) are often quite subjective, 
because the information that must be taken into account is too specific to e1pect to find 
readily assimilable observed frequencies based on large numbers of cases in the literature. 
Tbus, it is useful to realize tbat certain classes or bistorical iDf ormatJon. which seem to arrect 
tbe incidence or events or type Et. can be disregarded. In particular, according to equation 
(8 ). a datum in Hi will make LR(Hi) differ from 1 only 1f it arrects the incidence or events or 
type Et dHrerentially between drug and nondrug causes. That is, if. say, the patient bad some 
special attribute that doubled bis risk for events or type Et no matter what the cause, and the 
possession or this attribute by the patient was the only mf'ormation in Hi. LR(Hi) would be 1. 
Thus, any such attributes can be disregarded 1n caJculatJna LR(Hi) .. 
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Qtber Likelihood Ratio Factors: The likelihood ratio r actors ror timing, characteristics, 
dechallenge and rechallenge can best be evaluated by determining, separately, their 
numerators and denominators as given in equation (6) (for dechallenge). In carrying out 
these evaluations, the techniques of conditioning and analogy will be frequently applied. In 
particular, the probabilities given drug causation will depend on the mecharu~m of the 
adverse reaction, and the probabilities given nondrug causation will typically depend on what 
the alternative etiologies are; in both cases, conditioning on the appropriate entities is 
required. 
The calculations involved in evaluating these r actors are relativ,Jy straigbtf orward, 
compared to the prior odds and LR(Hi), and further discussion will be deferred to the 
example given in the next section. Here, we consider only one issue. Notice that the 
information in chronologically preceding categories is conditioned upon when the probability 
for information in succeeding categories is calculated, as required by the multiplicative 
condition for coherence. For e1ample, when calculating the probability that sulfonamide-
induced Stevens-Johnson begins, say three days after onset of therapy, it is necessary to 
condition on historical information, like the fact that the patient under consideration is atopic. 
This successive conditioning at first sight seems to introduce a great deal of comple1ity to the 
evaluations, but in fact this is not generally so: all the probability evaluations required for 
these likelihood ratio factors are oonditional on the ~ of the event E (D, or some other 
cause); and conditional on the cause. the sets of information in the var.ious categories are 
often independent, as would surely be the case with the timing information and the fact that 
the patient is atopic in the Stevens-Johnson example. When this conditional independence 
does not obtain, of course, the relevant conditioning information must be taken into account 
for a valid probability evaluation. This point is amply illustrated in the next section. 
4. An 8J1mote 
In this section, we apply the Bayesian approach to a case of suspected amoxicillin-induced 
diarrhea. The analysis is not based on a careful review of the literature; rather, it represents 
the clinical consensus of the authors of the paper, only one of whom (M.K.) bas special 
e1pertise in this area. Nonetheless, we believe that the analysis provides a good introduction 
to the Bayesian approach and that the conclusion we draw is both essentially correct and 
consistent with all our opinions relating to tbe problem. The ne1t paper in this series will 
analyze several more cases from the Bayesian point of view. and these cases will be 
substantially more problematic than the one analyzed here. 
THE CASE 
B.L. is a 17-month-old male day-care center attendee who on December 1 O developed 
signs and symptoms of an upper respiratory tract infection with rhinorrhea and cough, 
but without fever or gastrointestinal symptoms. On the third day or his illness. his 
temperature rose to 39.'IQC, he became irritable. and he began 10 pull at his ears. He was 
seen by his pediatrician on that day and was diagnosed as having bilateral otitis media. 
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Treatment was initiated with amo1Jclllln suspension in a dose of 125 m1 Ud. On the 
following day (the rourth day or the illness). B.L. had tbree watery bowel movements. By 
the fifth day. be was afebrlle; the diarrhea continued. but without e1acerbation. His 
mother telephoned the pediatrician. who suaested continuma the medication and 
encouraaina nuid intake. B.L. remained afebrile and became less irritable and more 
playful, but the diarrhea persisted. The amo1iclllln was discontinued on the thirteenth 
day (nine days after the diarrhea began). The diarrhea resolved on the fifteenth day (two 
days after dechallenge) and did not recur. 
ANALYSIS 
I ) Preliminary Identifications 
The Qinical Cpndition M: M is the upper respiratory tract infection (presumably viral). 
which by the third day is aocompanied by fever and bilateral otitis media. 
The Adverse Event Type Bi_: A bout or frequent, loose stools. which we shall hereafter 
ref er to as diarrhea, with a time horizon of one week from initiation of D-therapy. 
Possible causes of B: (1) Amo1icillln (denoted D hereafter): (2) Late-occurring GI 
symptoms secondary to the oriainal infection (that is, M); (3) Coincidental 
gas~roenteritis. 
2) Case Information (Refer to Table 1) 
Hi: There is no information about the patient's previous e:iperience with D or events of 
type Et- There is one attribute of the patient that places him at special risk to diarrhea 
from cause (3): he is a day-care attendee. 
TI: E began on the first day after D-therapy was initiated. 
Ch: The only relevant information in this category is tbe duration of B: tbe diarrhea 
persisted for ten days before dechaJtenae took place (from the fourth to the thirteenth 
day of illness). 
DI: The diarrhea resolved, two days arter dechalleue. 
Kl: No rechallenae occurred. 
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3) Evaluation or the Prior Odds 
To calculate the prior odds, we estimate the numerator and denominator of the ratio on 
the riaht hand side of equation (3 ), using observed frequencies obtained from a _study 
monitormg antibiotic-associated gastrointestinal symptoms in pediatric outpatients in 
Montreal (B.L.'s home) (some results from this study, but not the raw data that we use. are 
presented in ( 10, 11 )). In addition, we use data from Maricopa County, Arizona, presented in 
(20,2 l]. 
The first quantity we need to estimate is P(£ilD) - P(£il0C); this difference estimates the 
,.true" incidence of D-caused cases of events of type Bi- In the Montreal study, about 101 of 
the more than 1 .300 patients receiving amoiicillin suffered from diarrhea within a week of 
beginning therapy. How many of these were drug-caused? To answer this question, we 
would like to know what the incidence of diarrhea in the same period would be among 
patients with M if they were treated with a drug as effective as amo1icillin that could not 
induce diarrhea as a side effect. Of course. no such drug exists. However. the lowest 
incidence of diarrhea in the study followed trimethoprim/suJfamethoxazole therapy, and was 
of the order of 2.51 in the first week of therapy. Thus, we estimate that the incidence (per 
child) of amoxicillin-caused diarrhea in the first week of therapy is at least 0.l - 0.025 -
0.075. However, this is probably an underestimate, since some of the diarrhea following 
trimethoprim/sulfametho1azole may represent adverse reactions to this drug. Tbus, we 
must adjust our estimate of the incidence in nondrug-induced diarrhea downward somewhat, 
and as a result increase our estimate or t.he incidence of amo1Jcillin-Jnduced diarrhea. 
To decide how much of an adjustment to make. we argued along different lines. A lower 
bound for the incidence of nondrug-induced diarrhea can be obtained by thinking about the 
spontaneous occurrence of diarrhea (as in the definition of Et), in which no drug involvement 
is possible because the affected child was taking no drugs prior to the outbreak of the 
diarrhea. We assume that one- to two-year old children experience appro1imately one such 
episode per year on average (this estimate is based primarily on the data in (20), adjusted 
upward to reflect pediatric e:iperience in Montreal), which is equivalent to an incidence (per 
child) of about 0.019 per week. This figure must be increased somewhat, since it does not 
condition on the children having a viral infection (M), which increases the probability of 
developing diarrhea. We have thus determined that our estimate of the incidence (per child) 
or nondrug-induced diarrhea among children with M. in the week following initiation of 
amoiicllin therapy, should be greater than 0.019 and less than 0.025, and we adopt the value 
of 0.02. Thus, our estimate of the incidence (per child) of drug-caused diarrhea among such 
children in this time period is 0.1 - 0.02 • 0.08: this is our assessment of PCEclD) - PCEtll)C). 
To complete our evaluation of the prior odds, we need to assess P<Etlnc). our estimate for 
the incidence (per child) of nondrug-induced diarrhea in the calculation above was 0.02 cases 
per week. However. this estimate averaaes over the whole year. Now the incidence is 
substantially higher in the winter; in r act ( see (21) for example) we estimate that the 
incidence of nondrug-induced diarrhea in an average winter week is three times greater than 
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the overall averqe. Hence our estimate or the incidence (per cblld) or nondru1-lnduced cases 
or diarrhea in the week rollowlna initiation or amo1iclllin therapy is 0.06, which is our 
assessment ror P(BtlJ>c). 
Thus, applying equation (3 ). we evaluate the prior odds In favor or D-causation as 
Prior Oddi • IP(BtlD) - P(BtU,C)) / IP(Ball)C)J • 0.01/0.06 • 1,33 
4f) Evaluation or the Likelihood Ratio Factors 
LR(HH: We assume that day-care center attendees are 1.~ times as likely to suffer from 
non-drug-induced.diarrhea (because or the greater e:rposure rate) as the 1eneral pediatric 
population ( this estimate is primarily based on data in (21 )), while they are at no added risk 
for drug~induced diarrhea. With these assumptions, the ratio as eipressed in equation (8) is 
equal to 0.64. (To see this, 10 through the calculation of the prior odds again, with the only 
change being an increase in PCEtll)C) by a factor or IA; note that this change affects both the 
numerator and denominator or the expression used to evaluate the prior odds. According to 
equation (8), LR(Hi) is the ratio of the result of this calculation to the prior odds as calculated 
in the previous paragraph.) 
LR(Bi) 111 .64 
LR(Ti): Recall that we condition on (as part of B) the information that the event E begins 
after D-tberapy is irutiated. Taking this into account, the pediatrician in our group (MK) 
assessed the following distributions for time to onset of an event of type Bi starting from the 
beginning of D-therapy, in a patient with M, given that an event of this type does occur (and 
hence. because of the time horizon, occurs within one week or the beginning of D-therapy): 
Day or onset Ci l 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
P<day ilD->BJ 
.33 
.33 
.20 
.07 
.04 
.02 
.01 
Pf day ilM->Bl9 
.33 
.22 
.15· 
.11 
.09 
.06 
.04 
Pf day ilB coincidentall 
.14 
.14 
.14 
.14 
.14 
~1-1 
.I~ 
9 This distribution was induced from the following distribution, which represents the 
probability of 1ettin1 diarrhea beginning with the first day or M: .25 first day, .25 second 
day •. 15 third day, .1 fourth day, .07 fifth day, .05 silth day, .04 seventh day, .03 eighth day • 
. 02 ninth day, .04 tenth day or later. The distribution liven above is obtained from this one 
by conditioning on the diarrhea beginning between the third day (when D-therapy began) 
and the ninth day, a week later. 
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Here, "M->B" refers to cause (2) above, while "E coincidenlal" refers to cause (3). It sbould be 
noted that none of these timing distributions depend on the fact that B.L. attended a day-care 
center; that is, the information in Ti and the information in Hi are independent. aiven the 
cause of B. 
Since B actually occurre'd on the second day or D-therapy. the numerator of the likelihood 
ratio factor for timing is .33. To evaluate the denominator, we need to evaluate two 
additional quantities, the probabilities for causes (2) and (3), given that D did not cause B. By 
the addition rule, these two numbers sum to 1. Because our estimate for the rate or 
coincidental diarrheas is 0.019 and our estimate for the rate of all nondrua-caused diarrheas 
is 0.02, we set P(M->BID/>B) - 0.02 - 0.019 / 0.02 - .05 (so that the probability that M did not 
cause E, given that D did not cause E. is 0.95). Thus, the denominator of the likelihood ratio 
for timing, using the Law of Total Probability, is obtained as follows, where "day 2" is short 
for "onset of B occurs on day 2". "M*B" represents the proposition that B was caused by a 
coincidental gastroenteritis, and every probability is conditional on background information 
B: 
P(day 2ID/>B) • (P(day 2IM->B) I P(M->BID/>B)) + (P(day 2l~B) I P(~BID/>B)) 
Thus, 
• (.22 :i .05) + (.14 x .95) 
• .144; 
LR(Ti) • P(oaset OD day 2ID->I) + P(oa1et OD day 21D/>I) 
• .33 + .144 
m 2,J 
Note that in the calculation for LR(Ti), the only part of the three timing distributions that 
was actually used was the probability they assigned to day 2, the day on which E actually 
occurred. Thus, jf another assessor gives the same probabilities to day 2 but differs with us 
about the probabilites assigned to other days, the answer that assessor obtains for LR(Ti) for 
lhi1 case will agree with ours. The reason for assessing tbe entire distribution is that it 
provides a oonte1t for the one evaluation that counts, the probability assigned to what 
actually happened. 
LR(Cb): To evaluate t.his factor. we need to calculate the probability that an event or type 
Bi will last at teast ten days (corresponding to the fact that Blasted from the fourth day of the 
illness until the time or dechalleqe, which occurred on the thirteenth day of the illness), 
given the hypotheses or drug and nondrug causation. Again, given the cause of B, the 
illlformation whose probability we need to asse88 is independent of the information in Ti and 
Hi. 
• 
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Assumlna that D caused B. M.L. based on bJs cllnJcal e1perlence. assessed the probabWty 
that an event ~ type Et would last at least ten days. liven that the event was an adverse 
reaction to D as 0.7. 
Assuming that D did not cause B. we believed that whether M caused B or B was 
coincidental to M, the time to resolution distribution was the same. This distribution was 
usessed by the pediatrician M.K. as follows: the probability that the diarrhea would end 
before five days is 0.3; between five ud seven days, 0 . .-4; on the eiahth or ninth day, 0.15; on 
the tenth day. 0.05; on the eleventh day, 0.03; on the twelfth day, 0.02; and Jonser than 
twelve days, 0.05. Therefore, tbe probability that an event of type Rt would last at lea~ ten 
days, given a nondru1 cause, is 0.03 + 0.02 + 0.05 - 0.1. 
Ll(Cb) • 0.7 + 0.1 tl 
LR(De): We need to calculate the probability that the diarrhea·will resolve two days after 
dechallenge with D, given the hypotheses of drug and nondrug causation and given that the 
diarrhea had persisted until the time of dechallenge. These calculations are handled just as 
were the corresponding ones relative to the timing information. First, as e1plained in the 
discussion of Cb, we decided that there would be no difference in our distribution for the 
duration of the diarrhea whether it was caused by M or by a coincidental gastroenteritis. 
Using the distribution for duration of diarrhea above. conditioned to last at least JO days, the 
probability that the diarrhea would resolve in the second day after dechallenge, given 
nondrug causation, is 0.02 I (0.03 + 0.02 + 0.05) • 0.2. 
Assuming drug causation, the pediatrician M.K. assessed the following timing distribution 
for resolution: first day after dechallenge, 0.33: second day, 0.33; third day, 0.20: at least four 
days, 0.14 (this is just the distribution for time of onset, reversed). 
LR(De) • 0.33 / 0.2 • 1.65 
LR(Re ): Since no rechallenge occurred, this factor is equal to 1. 
5) f,onclusion: According to equation (7), to calculate the posterior odds in favor or D-
causation, we must multiply together the prior odds and the likelihood ratio factors. Thus: · 
Posterior odd1 - Prior ocld1 :1 LR(Bi) s LR(Ti) :1 LR(Cb) :1 LR(De) 
• 1.33 :r 0.64 :r 2.3 . :r 7 :r 1.65 
• 22,6 
That is, the posterior odds are overwhelmingly in favor of drug causation (not surprisinllY, 
since all the evidence, e1cept that fact that tbe patient attended a day-care center, pointed in 
the same direction); the posterior probability of drug causation equals 22.6/23.6 or 0.96. 
Note that the strongest positive evidence was simply how Iona the diarrhea lasted before 
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decballenae occurred; had tbe amo1icWin been lmmedlitely discontinued, the case for drua 
causation would have been rar less convinciq -- and had In addition the drua been 
trimethoprim/sultametho1azole instead of amo1icWin. so that the prior odds in favor cl drug 
causation would be substantially lower (in r act, less than l ). the posterior odds would have 
favored a nondrua cause ror the diarrhea. 
5. Cau11llty A•u•••tot Criteria and the lu11t10 A11roacb 
In this section, we argue that tbe Bayesian approacb to causality assessment satisfies, at 
least in principle. at least CJve or the sil criteria introduced in ( t .f). Tbe qualification °at least 
in principle" is necessary, because as presented in sections 2 and 3. the approach is difficult 
to implement and does not yet qualify as a standarized assessment method. Nonetheless, the 
Bayesian approach does substantially better with respect to these criteria, com pared with 
other current causality assessment methods (see ( 14), where the schemes introduced in the 
following papers were evaluated according to the siJ criteria: (2,3,6,7,8,9,12,16,17,18)). 
Moreover. we believe that with further work it will be possible to develop techniques tha~ 
make the approach easy to use without sacrificing what we see as its essential correctness. 
We state each criterion (for justifications and discussion. see 114)) and tben discuss how it 
relates to the Bayesian approach. 
O:iterion J: Repeatability. 
When the same "state of information .. is used more than once as input a causality 
assessment method sho~ld produce the same "degree of belier as output 
Discussion: ln its present form. the Bayesian approach is just too complicated to achieve 
repeatability. The difficulty is not so much that there are too many probability assessments 
to make, each of which may vary from one evaluation session to the ne1t even when the 
"state of information .. does not change. Rather. the main problem is to determine in a 
standardized way what probabilities need to be evaluated for each of the components of the 
posterior odds. We believe that it will be possible to develop algorithmic methods based 
upon the Bayesian approach, in the conte1t of specific drug-induced diseases (like cholestatic 
jaundice or Stevens-Johnson syndrome) or specific problem drugs (like digo1in). In such 
speclfic problem areas, .. canonical"" questions ror eliciting the relevant information and 
operating with this information to determine the appropriate probabilities can be 
constructed. The more algorithmic the methods become, the more they will be able to satisfy 
this criterion. 
Q:iterion 2: Blplicitness , 
A causality assessment method should require that its user make e1pliclt his "state of 
information··, including the uncertainty be feels about each of its elements. 
Discussion: The essence-or the Bayesian approach is the e1plicit evaluation or uncertainty. 
so this requirement of the criterion is certainly satisfied. Since probabilities are most easily 
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evaluated tbe more e1baustively the problems are decomposed, the approach encourages the 
user to make e1pliclt all bis relevant information and the relations between its elements. 
Moreover, the techniques or conditioning and analogy provide a framework in which these 
relations can be systematically e1pressed. 
Q:iterion 3; Blplanatory Capability 
A causality assessment method must "e1plain" how it reaches its conclusions; that is, it 
must make it clear to the user why it produced the output ·dearee or belier from the 
information it elicited. 
Discussion: The Bayesian approach reaches its conclusions from the component probability 
evaluations of the user by following the rules of presaiptive probability theory; that is. in the 
only coherent way. Moreover. the effect of the information in each factor on the output 
posterior odds is clear. since the posterior odds is just the product of the prior odds and the 
five likelihood ratio factors. In particular. it is easy to see at a atance which factors are the 
important ones in any assessment. 
On tbe otber band, the metbod does not .. e1plain" tbe probabilities that the user himself' 
directly evaluates. Since these measure bis own uncertainty about the propositions in 
question. in general be does not need an e1planation for them. The e1ception occurs when 
the approach requires the user to evaluate probabilities ibout propositions that are 
meaningless to him. It· should be possible to avoid this situation by creative decompositions 
and elicitation techniques. but we certainly cannot now guarantee to do so. 
Q:iterion 4; C.OmpJeteness 
Any r act, theory or opinion that can arr ect an evaluator's belief that a drua D caused an 
adverse event B must be incorporable by a causality assessment method into the "state of 
information" on which the assessment is based. 
Discussion: In principle, any such fact. theory or opinion can become the subject or a 
probability evaluation or the basis upon which such an evaluation is carried out. In 
particular, the Bayesian approach can deal with the three kinds of information singled out in 
( 14) as essential, but not incorporable into other current assessment methods: uncertain 
information, quantitative information, and backaround information, especially 
epidemiological data about incidences and mechanistic theories from the basic sciences. Thus. 
the Bayesian approach already satisfies this criterion in principle; as better models are 
constructed to r acilltate the incorporation or particular kinds or information, it will 
ina-easingly be able easily to satisfy it in practice. 
c:riterion S: BtiotoaicaJ baJpcinp 
Methods cannot evaluate case data just in terms of their concordance or discordance with 
the hypothesis that the drua D caused the event B; rather, tbey must balance the likelihood or 
the data assumina that D caused B qainst the Utellhood 111umma alt.ernative causes. 
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p;scussion: This criterion is embedded in the architecture or the Bayesian approacb. 
Q:iterion 6; No a priori mnstraiQts on the effects or [actors 
A causality assessment method should not limit. a priori tbe effect I.hat information about 
any particular factor can have on the output "dearee or belief'. 
Discussion: Each or the rwe likelihood ratio factors and the prior odds can ranae anywhere 
between zero and infinity. so the Bayesian approach places no a priori limits on their possible 
effects. Ratber, these effects are only limited by the amount or information available and the 
state or the user's uncertainty about that information. 
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TABLB I: BLICITJNG CASB INFQBNAIIQN 
The assessor should answer each of the followiDI questions. If he is unsure of the correct 
answer. he should state the 1rounds and e1teat or bis uncertainty (in probabilistic terms). 
While the answers to these questions will provide all or the relevant case information for 
many cases. any additional case information that can help differentiate between D and 
nondrug etiologfoal candidates in a particular case under review should also be noted in the 
appropriate chronological period. 
1. Hi: 
a. Has the patient taken D or similar drugs before? How frequently? On how many or 
these occasions did he e1perience an event or type Rt or another possible adverse reaction 
( describe, if different from Et)? 
b. How frequently has the patient previously e1perienced events of type Et without 
exposure to D or related drugs? 
c. Are there any attributes of the patient that place_ him at_special risk to events or type Bi 
from any cause? If so. what are they. and from which causes is he at special risk? 
2. Ii: When in relation to the course of D-therapy did the patient e1perience the event B (if 
available, give the time-course of all prodromal events)? 
3. Ch: 
a. Is there any data about levels of D in tissues or body fluids during the time the patient 
experienced E? If so, what are they? 
b. Are there any distinctive details in clinical presentation, laboratory results. patholORical 
findings or duration that can help differentially diagnose the cause of B? If so, what are 
they? 
c. Did the symptoms of B abate before decballenge occurred? If so. bow long after the 
time of onset of B? 
4. ~= 
a. Was D discontinued or its dosage reduced after the onset of B? If so, describe bow and 
when. 
b. IC dechallenge occurred, did the symptoms of B abate? If so, to what e1tent and when? 
c. Were the symptoms rl B treated directly? Was a specific antagonist to D administered? 
What was the result? 
s. b.: 
a. If dechallenge occurred, was the patient subsequently rechalleqed with D? If so, 
when and in what dosqe? 
b. Did another event of type Et (or related type) occur after recballenae? If so, when? 
j 
APPENDJCFS 
Appendh: t: Bayes· Theorem and the Law or Total Probability 
Bayes· Theorem is derived from the multiplicative condition. which establishes the 
following equality: 
(I) P(AIB) :1 P(QA and B) • P(QB) 1 P(AIC and B). 
Dividing both sides or ( 1) by P(CIB) aives 
(2) P(AIC and B) • (P(CIA and B) x P(AIB)) / P(QB), 
which is Bayes' Theorem. To derive the odds form or Bayes· Theorem, apply the theorem 
with Ac in plac:e of A to obtain 
(3) P(ACIC and B) • (P(aAc and B) 1 P(ACIB)] / P(CIB). 
Finally. divide equation (2) by equation (3), yieldinl 
( 4) f(AIC and Bl • PCCIA and Bl :1 PCAIBl . 
P(AclC and B) P(QAc and B) P(AclB) 
The Law of Total Probability is derived as follows. First, sinc:e the propositions A1.-,A0 are 
mutually contradictory and one of them is true, 
(5) C • (C and A1) or (C and A2) or - or (C and A0 ). 
By the additivity condition, which obviously e1tends ton mutually contradictory propositions, 
(6) P(OB) • P(C and A1IB) + - + P(C and A0 IB). 
Now apply the multiplicative condition to each term on the right or (3): 
(7) P(QB) • (P(CIB and A 1) 1 P(A 1IB)J + ... + (P(QB and A11) :1 P(A11IB)). 
Appendil 2: The One-Dru1-at-a-Time Strategy 
Let D1, -, D0 represent all the (mutually contradictory) drug hypotheses on the list of 
causes, and aroup all the other hypotheses (for example: M, "other". etc.) as N (for nondrua). 
Write PO(D1) for tbe posterior odds In favor or cause D1• Now let A1 represent the 
hypothesis '1>1 or N .. (that is, the cause or E is either D1, or a nondrug cause. and write 
PO(D11A1) for the posterior odds in favor of cause D1• given A1: 
ll 
Notice that PO(D11A1) solves the causality assessment problem for a case in which there is omy 
one dru1 causal candidate, D1• 
Clli.m.: The following formula gives the posterior odds in favor of cause D1: 
That is, if the assessor calculates the conditional posterior odds in favor or cause o,. PO(D1tA1), 
ror each possible drug cause O,, then he can merae these condition odds to obtain the 
unconditional posterior odds in r avor of cause D1• 
Proof of Claim: For succinctness. we omit B and C from the right or the 111" in all the 
probabilities that appear in this proof. By the multiplicative condition and the fact that A1 is 
equal to 11D1 or N'., 
(3) P(D.IA1) = P(Di and A1) / P<A1) 
= P<D1) / (P(Di) + P(N)). 
Similarly, 
(4) P(DflA1) • P(N) / (P(D1) + P(N)). 
Thus, 
Applying equation (5) for each drug cause n,. the right-hand side of equation (2) is equal to 
(6) (P(D1)/P(N)) / ( 1 + !1-1 P<D1)/P(N)) • PCD1) / (P(N) + !1-1 PCO,)) 
• P(Di) / (1 - P(D1)J 
= PO(D1), 
which completes the proof or the claim. 
-, 
.. 
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Appendil 3: PredictJye Probability and the ,:rue" lncJdenm 
The tactic discussed in section 3 under "Bvaluatma the Prior Odds" derives from the 
following theorem. due to deFinetti: 
Suppose X1, X2, _ is a sequence of (0,1)-valued random variables, whose distribution is 
invariant under any reordering or the variables. Tben 
( 1) P(X1 • 1) • 110.11 y dG(y), 
where G is the distribution function for the random variable 
Y • lim0 _,.. ((Xi + ... + Ia) / n]. 
Ut is a conclusion of the theorem that this limit eiists.) 
Tbe expression on the right of equation ( 1) is called the mean of the distribution G. If G .bas a 
density function a, then 
I 10.11 Y dG(y) = 110.11 Y g(y) dy. 
To interpret the theorem in the conteit of this paper, 11, X2, _ represents a sequence of 
future patients with clinical condition M who, say, are to receive a specified course of D-
therapy and of whom nothing additional is known (that is, "generic" patients with the two 
stated properties. Because of their "genericness", the assessor's probability distribution for 
wbJcb of these patients will eiperience an event of type Et does not depend on their labelling, 
so the theorem applies. Y represents the "true" incidence. Theus, the theorem implies that if 
the assessor evaluates bis distribution G for the "true" incidence. bis predictive probability 
that the ne1t patient will eiperience an event of type Bt (that is, that X1•1), or P<BtlD), is just 
the mean of the distribution G .
